The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is moving fast from experimental to enterprise-ready. I am working with a number of customers / prospects / community members who want to go beyond locally deployed...
In the previous blog, we dug into dynamically registering OAuth clients leveraging SPIFFE and SPIRE. We used SPIRE to issue software statements in the SPIFFE JWT SVID that Keycloak can trust as par...
The MCP Authorization spec recommends using OAuth Dynamic Client Registration (DCR) for registering MCP clients with MCP servers. More specifically, it suggests using anonymous DCR: meaning any cli...
In this blog post, we’ll walk through an OAuth 2.0 token exchange and delegation to an A2A Agent. We will focus on configuring the A2A Agent Card, implementing the agent in Python, and validating t...
We know building MCP servers are where everyone’s mind is when it comes to AI agents. That is, if you’re going to build useful AI agents, they will need access to enterprise data, tools, and contex...
This is a bonus post following on from my Understanding MCP Authorization three part series covering building (and understanding) an MCP HTTP based server and implementing the MCP Authorization spe...
The Agent-to-Agent (A2A) protocol is emerging as the de-facto standard for how autonomous AI agents talk to each other. While most of the interest around A2A has been around stateful messaging, one...
This is the final post in a three-part series on MCP Authorization following the June 2025 revisions. In the first two posts, we built an MCP server with the HTTP transport and implemented the righ...
In this post (part two of three), we’ll dig into the June 2025 MCP Authorization specification more closely. See Part One for setting up the MCP Server using HTTP Transport. Generally, in this s...
Creating MCP Servers to connect functionality to LLM applications / AI agents is fairly straight forward. Most of the examples you see, however, are the simple stdio-transport MCP servers. If you w...
I’ve been writing a lot recently about Agent identity, how crucial it is in Agentic systems for not only security but monitoring, auditing and causality/attribution as well. But we cannot talk abou...
At first glance, AI agents seem very similar to microservices when it comes to security and identity. You need to secure the channel and authorize who is calling whom. Communication happens over th...
I’ve been digging into Agent Identity, authentication/authorization patterns, and how it fits in with existing technology patterns (OAuth 2.0, OIDC, SPIFFE, etc) and where it may need new solutions...
In earlier posts exploring AI agent and agent identity, Do We Even Need Agent Identity? and Agent Identity: Impersonation or Delegation?, I dug into the identity tradeoffs surrounding AI agents in ...
In a recent blog post, I discussed whether AI agents need their own identity. I ended with “yes, they do”, but how do we end up doing that? In this blog, we’ll look at a very important concept when...
As API adoption matured in enterprise organizations, a natural pattern emerged and we are seeing something similar in AI agent architectures: using layers to contain complexity. Dealing with team b...
In our recent engineering face-to-face, one of our engineers raised what seemed like a simple question: “Why can’t we just pass the user’s OIDC token through to the agent? Why complicate things wit...
It’s a little after 5p, and I’m about to wrap up for the day. As I’m starting to shut things down, I get a message from my boss: Jeff and Lisa are looking into some issues, the mortgage team is...
As organizations start to deploy AI agents in earnest, we are discovering just how easy it is to attack these kind of systems. I went into quite some detail about how “natural language” introduces ...
Mitigations Potential Mitigations for Naming Attacks To address these vulnerabilities, we should consider: Strict Registration Policies: Implementing formal registration systems with ver...